5 responses to “HAVE YOUR SAY: How can we make aid work safer?”

1. Michael Kleinman says:
   01 Sep 2008 09:24:20 GMT

   The question of whether working closely with security forces jeopardizes neutrality is straightforward - it certainly does. It's hard to see how a humanitarian agency can expect to be seen as neutral when it cooperates with a combatant force. This, however, begs two fundamental questions. First, how important is it for aid agencies to remain neutral, or to be perceived as such?

   Traditionally, aid agencies based their security on the assumption that as long as they remained neutral, they would not be seen as a threat. Neutrality was therefore seen as essential, not only for security reasons, but also to ensure that combatants would allow aid agencies access to populations under their control.
   In some conflicts, however, this assumption no longer holds true. In Iraq and, increasingly in Afghanistan and Somalia, insurgents view western aid agencies as part of the occupying forces, regardless of what the agencies themselves profess. As Samantha Power noted in her Op-Ed, the Taliban issued a statement after killing four aid workers in Afghanistan on August 13th, accusing them of working for "foreign invader forces".
   (It's not just insurgents who ignore aid agencies claims to neutrality - in October 2001, a few weeks after the invasion of Afghanistan, Colin Powell gave a speech in which he called NGOs "force multipliers" and "such an important part of our combat team".)
   That said, it would a mistake to generalize too far. In many conflicts, aid agencies are still perceived as more or less neutral, and therefore are able to operate without taking extraordinary security measures like cooperating with combatant forces.
   The second question is whether, in conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan, the advantages of working with security forces outweigh the risks. Especially as there are other ways of operating, including increased reliance on national staff, or "remote programming", in which humanitarian agencies work through local partners.
   At the end of the day, my personal opinion is that need outweighs other concerns. If working closely with security forces is the only way to deliver assistance to vulnerable populations, than I think it must be considered as an option of last-resort, even if this undermines neutrality.
   For me, the red-line is not neutrality per se but impartiality. I believe humanitarian organizations should never work with combatants who make their cooperation contingent on agencies distributing aid to some populations but not others.

2. Shaun Smyth says:
   01 Sep 2008 21:30:42 GMT

   In a perfect world, we would stop the main reason that aid is needed in the first place, The commerce of arms.

   That said, I suggest that "aid" comes in (mainly) two forms, one as a direct reply to human nefast behaviour (A), and the other as a reaction to mainly natural causes (B). If situations are then classified by origin as A or B, the "use" of security forces in an A situation becomes part of the problem. In B, security forces should be part of the solution.
   OK, that is probably an over simplification. There are situations where the political will to "use" aid for political gain overweighs purely humanitarian sentiments. (ie. Myanmar, US in Afghanistan?) But by coding the origin it might be possible to grade the type of aid that is feasable for a given situation, and so limit risks to aid-workers. - and concentrate on natural disasters

3. Bobby Bear says:
   02 Sep 2008 02:10:09 GMT

   This can be achieved with professional private fully equiped indipendant armed escorts which should also comprise elements of the tribal group to which the aid is destined for.

   Prior to this the permission of the trbal rulers should first be sought and together with their representitive approach the security units commanders in the area to be seviced to inform them what their objective are.
   It should also be made clear that if any breach of the agreement occured the combined group would defend the mission even if it meant taking out any security detail

4. Michael O'Neill says:
   03 Sep 2008 01:57:49 GMT

   Humanitarian organizations have developed security management strategies largely based on the ‘acceptance’ approach. Acceptance is founded on effective relationships with and gaining consent from beneficiaries, local authorities, belligerents and other stakeholders in an operational area as a means of reducing or removing potential threats in order to undertake program activities. Gaining acceptance among stakeholders is directly related to an agency’s mission and positive stakeholder perceptions of the agency’s image. Local perceptions are influenced by project design and accountability, agency adherence to humanitarian principles and staff behavior that is respectful of cultural norms.

   Neutrality and impartiality are key humanitarian principles by which we abide. First and foremost these principles are intended to clearly distinguish combatants from non-combatants in conflict environments consistent with international humanitarian law. It is incumbent upon all belligerents to respect IHL and the humanitarian prerogative. When state and non-state actors in a conflict determine to manipulate humanitarian assistance in order to further their military objectives thus compromising humanitarian principles, relief programs are jeopardized, beneficiaries are denied assistance and humanitarian actors are placed at greater risk. While gaining acceptance from beneficiaries is more easily earned, the challenge remains with gaining even tacit consent among narco-barons, local commanders, tribal leaders and local politicians without being manipulated as a tool for their narrow political ends.
   Added to the challenge is the unfortunate reality that humanitarian organizations have failed to gain acceptance as a group. Despite rhetoric affirming ‘a sense of community’ among humanitarian organizations we rarely represent ourselves with unity of mission on municipal, regional and central government level largely due to competition among organizations, differences in programs objectives and design, individual personalities and national/ethnic backgrounds. Humanitarian, religious, private sector and to a growing extent civil/military organizations are often perceived locally as virtually indistinguishable. An individual organization may well have established an effective acceptance-based approach that can be completely undone by the behavior, affiliation or other attributes of another unrelated organization.
   In Afghanistan humanitarian organizations have of necessity augmented their acceptance-based security strategies with significant doses of protective measures and in some cases (as a last resort) some deterrent approaches. But we are ever mindful that there are trade offs and therefore limits to what more we can do and how far we are willing to eschew our principles in order ratchet up our security in order to provide relief assistance. For the more we harden our facilities and submit to armed protection the more barriers we place between ourselves and the people we serve. Humanitarian convoys bristling with armed escorts or facilities patrolled by armed guards will likely alienate the very people we are committed to serve, but even more importantly are not likely to be effective strategies against a determined threat. How many armed and armored personnel have succumbed to attacks by heavy weapons and IEDs? The Taliban have demonstrated agility and innovation in adaptin! g to a variety of security countermeasures applied by coalition forces. As we (humanitarians) harden our facilities and exercise deterrnt force (as suggested above) the Taliban are as likely to change tactics in response. Are we as humanitarians ready to join the local arms race?
   Prior to 2001 many humanitarian organizations had gained the Taliban’s tacit consent to implement programs in Afghanistan. Since the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the US and the subsequent retaliation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan the already complicated local relationships developed by humanitarian organizations have become more complex. The debate among humanitarians in recent years has centered on levels of ‘cooperation’ with the government of Afghanistan and the coalition forces including PRTs, funding from government donors that have committed combat troops to Afghanistan, the ‘morality’ of extending risk to our national staff and national partner organizations through remote management and local partnership arrangements, and the appropriateness of the acceptance approach as a foundation for an effective security strategy in Afghanistan.
   Whereas neither protection nor deterrence will ultimately secure any of us from a determined assault and would ultimately undermine our mission and program delivery, I submit that only an acceptance-based security strategy might succeed. The vast majority of our national staff and partners are faithful Muslims acting in accordance with the tenets of their faith. Is there not common ground among Muslims by which to re-establish ‘acceptance’ in a manner unique to Islam? A cursory search of the internet reveals the following Quranic references.
   The Holy Quran instructs, “And worship Allah and associate naught with Him, and show kindness to parents, and to kindred, and orphans, and the needy, and to the neighbor who is a kinsman, and the neighbor who is a stranger, and the companion by your side, and the wayfarer, and those whom your right hands possess. Surely, Allah loves not the arrogant and the boastful” (4:37)
   اعÙ'بُدُواÙ' اللÙ'هَ وَلاَ تُشÙ'رِكُواÙ' بِهِ شَيÙ'ئاً وَبِالÙ'وَالِدَيÙ'نِ إِحÙ'سَاناً وَبِذِي الÙ'قُرÙ'بَى وَالÙ'يَتَامَى وَالÙ'مَسَاكِينِ وَالÙ'جَارِ ذِي الÙ'قُرÙ'بَى وَالÙ'جَارِ الÙ'جُنُبِ وَالصÙ'َاحِبِ بِالجَنبِ وَابÙ'نِ السÙ'َبِيلِ وَمَا مَلَكَتÙ' أَيÙ'مَانُكُمÙ' إِنÙ'َ اللÙ'هَ لاَ يُحِبÙ'ُ مَن كَانَ مُخÙ'تَالاً فَخُوراً
   Additionally, the Quran admonishes, “But whoso does good works, whether male or female, and he or she is a believer, such shall enter heaven, and shall not be wronged even as much as the little hollow in the back of a date-stone.” (4:125)
   وَمَن يَعÙ'مَلÙ' مِنَ الصÙ'َالِحَاتَ مِن ذَكَرٍ أَوÙ' أُنثَى وَهُوَ مُؤÙ'مِنٌ فَأُوÙ'لَـئِكَ يَدÙ'خُلُونَ الÙ'جَنÙ'َةَ وَلاَ يُظÙ'لَمُونَ نَقِيراً
   And whoso slays a believer intentionally, his reward shall be Hell wherein he shall abide. And Allah shall be wroth with him and shall curse him and shall prepare for him a great punishment.
   وَمَن يَقÙ'تُلÙ' مُؤÙ'مِناً مÙ'ُتَعَمÙ'ِداً فَجَزَآؤُهُ جَهَنÙ'َمُ خَالِداً فِيهَا وَغَضِبَ اللÙ'هُ عَلَيÙ'هِ وَلَعَنَهُ وَأَعَدÙ'َ لَهُ عَذَاباً عَظِيماً
   Similarly, we should not ignore the traditional code of the Pashto people (Pakhtunwali) whose values may be instrumental in recreating humanitarian space (at least in those Pashto areas where we implement programs). For instance, “the famous and greatest demand of Pakhtunwali is Melmasthia (melma means a guest), hospitality and protection to every guest irrespective whether he be an outsider, not in a position to return it, or be his fellow tribesman. A Pathan does not care for colour, race, religion, or qaum in respect to Melmasthia, this is the proof that Pathans are free of any prejudice, juandice and unnecessary ill will.” (Mohamed Enam Wak). of course we recognize that ‘traditional’ Afghan perceptions and norms have changed during the last years influenced by ‘outside elements’. Many traditional cultural norms commonly practiced in the past have been modified. Afghans recently returning from Pakistan, Iran and other places where they have lived during the! war note that Afghanistan has become a less personal society and that traditional patience and respect to new-comers, travelers and guests has been supplanted in some quarters by growing intolerance.
   Surely, among humanitarian organizations are respected Muslim and Pashtun staff members and/or advisors of stature who should be sought out and consulted as to how we, as a community, might approach Taliban leadership and other influential local and religious authorities in order to negotiate consent for our staff and programs to operate. This will not be an easy task and is fraught with its own risks. Yet without this dialogue the way forward is unclear. Negotiations may require significant changes in program design and focus, relationships with current donors and perhaps organizational leadership in Afghanistan. We should be guided by our humanitarian objective to relieve the suffering of those affected by the current conflict over and above our national and organizational interests. Should we fail in our attempts to establish some form of acceptance, we are left with few remaining options. Either we maintain the status quo perhaps with some modification thereby acc! epting the likelihood of more aggression against humanitarian workers as the ‘cost of doing business’ (even though much of the work we are doing under the humanitarian banner is not truly life saving), we relegate our work to areas ‘secured’ by the Government of Afghanistan and the coalition that supports it, or we withdraw altogether.

5. Mohammad Ilyas says:
   11 Sep 2008 21:05:28 GMT

   Unless and untill a government is established of own people in Iraq and any other country which is under foreign occupation, no aid working group or any other organisation will be safely doing its job. The coalition forces have been occupying and not able to satisfy the population just because of the lack of keenness for the cause. Saddam was toppled but no reasonable government was erected just to bring the wealth of the area into own hands of the occupants. Mr.Bush had first even nominated a General as the governor General of Iraq as a colony. Similarly, in Afghanistan Talibans were first defeated but the United States appointed people of own interest there which did not work and rather made the situation worse and the occupants being only bound to the main roads and cities.

Leave a Reply

Name (required)

Mail (will not be published) (required)

Website

Enter the code shown on on the left *