As donor nations pledge billions for tsunami relief, consultant and writer Nick Cater suggests local institutions should be at the centre of spending decisions, not international agencies.

LONDON (AlertNet) – Three-hundred-and-fifty million dollars, $500 million, $800 million… As political leaders line up to make their pledges at the Jakarta conference on the Asian tsunami disaster, it seems churlish to suggest there could ever be too much aid.

But the sheer scale of the crisis and its response does raise concern, not least about whether the supposed $4 billion in pledges and fundraising will ever turn into real money or actually reach those in need.

Significant proportions of early donor pledges do not seem to have reached their intended recipients in disasters as disparate as Hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998 and the Bam earthquake in Iran in late 2003, while a multi-sector evaluation of the Rwanda response in 1994 could not identify where hundreds of millions of dollars went.

Every year, government sleight-of-hand means many consolidated appeals for disasters see three successively shrinking figures: what's needed, what's pledged and what actually arrives. The same problem besets agencies such as the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees.

Not only might less pledging and more cash seem a better option, but even before the issue of corruption is raised, there are worries that the spending may stretch the capacity of those handling the money to do an effective job or the ability of communities to absorb the impending flood of money.

One downside of the global attention given to the tsunami is that any organisation with a plausible connection to Asia -- and probably many with little or no experience in the region - has been able to raise significant sums for disaster relief.

The likely consequences are not necessarily positive.

Far too many small international agencies could be using up far too much money on overheads, flights, hotels and expatriate staff to conduct assessments and plan projects that lack the essential coordination to avoid duplication or gaps.

Another possible problem is that most of the money raised from the public must now be regarded as earmarked for this particular disaster, whatever horror happens tomorrow to other disaster victims who may be less accessible, telegenic or "deserving".

Surely one clear lesson of the fundraising excess after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States is that donations should always to be clearly sought for "our disaster fund" or some such, rather than anything specific.

HARMONISE SPENDING

Clearly the tsunami relief and rehabilitation efforts will need careful monitoring, and planning now for a Rwanda-style major evaluation would be helpful too.

But getting the right systems and structures in place needs a more basic approach. Luckily, there is the good news that the U.S.-led regional coordination group, a politically motivated effort to undermine the United Nations, is no more, apparently shamed by international reaction into working within U.N. efforts.

Ideally, broad priorities and budgets for the region and each country affected will be agreed under a U.N. umbrella, perhaps with a specific U.N. representative, so the mix of governments, multilateral institutions and NGOs can harmonise spending and operations.

The most important question, however, is what role the region's governments, national and local, and non-governmental organisations and faith networks will be allowed to play.

Only if they are at the centre of decision-making and spending will recovery efforts enhance local capacities and be sustainable, including investment in disaster preparedness, such as the planned Indian Ocean tsunami warning system.

The region faces a swarm of international agencies, large and small, invading the tsunami disaster zone and looking for local operating partners, when far fewer agencies of a greater scale to tackle such a major disaster would be more effective.

No wonder India resists the lure of international assistance in this and other disasters, when it can come with so many additional costs and problems.

One option might be for smaller agencies on either side of this relationship to operate in consortia, sharing tasks, costs and management.

Money should be channelled through existing operational institutions, especially those with fairly clear mechanisms for accountability to affected communities -- local councils, Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, faith groups -- rather than undermining them by creating new and probably unsustainable structures vulnerable to undemocratic political or commercial manipulation.

Grants or contracts should, for a change, include realistic figures for overheads and core costs.

And if pledges do turn into cash and there is too much money to spend well at once, especially given the long-term needs, international agencies and governments should look for solutions that enhance local capacity and skills, as well as responsibility and accountability.

Why not endowed local disaster funds, with a minority of international trustees if necessary, so the interest can be spent and capital drawn down gradually as evolving needs become clear?

(c) Copyright Nick Cater/Words & Pictures 2005