Executive Summary

Figure 1. Current food security conditions FULL-SIZE IMAGE Source: FEWS NET

Figure 2. Most likely scenario (February through July 2007) FULL-SIZE IMAGE Source: FEWS NET

Figure 3. Worst-case scenario (February through July 2007) FULL-SIZE IMAGE Source: FEWS NET

• Current food security conditions in Mauritania indicate that the hunger season is settling in earlier than usual, particularly in rural areas. Reported food access problems are attributed to mediocre local grain availability, limited cross-border trade and high market prices. While current conditions do not represent a food crisis, there are pockets of highly food-insecure populations, consisting mainly of poor, rural farm families.

• In the most likely food security scenario for Mauritania, even with ongoing programs, new pockets of food insecurity will appear in agropastoral and pastoral areas as the dry season settles in. Continued shortages of water and pasture are expected, as are increased animal sales, falling livestock prices and mass seasonal migration. The food security status of rural farming areas is expected to deteriorate from highly to extremely food insecure, which could mean localized food crises for poor single-crop farmers in rainfed farming areas, farmers in the Senegal River Valley and Aftout and small-scale herders in transhumant pastoral areas.

• It is highly unlikely that conditions will reach worst-case scenario pre-famine levels, since current interventions are working relatively well. Moreover, rural residents possess a range of coping strategies to facilitate their access to food. The informal sector in urban areas and neighboring countries also continues to offer migrant workers income-earning opportunities, the remittances of which help support family members back home.

Current food situation

Mauritania’s grain production forecast for 2006/07 estimates output at 173,400 metric tons. This figure is 13% below last year’s production level, but 18% above the average for the last five years, three of which (2001/2002, 2002/2003 and 2004/2005) were high deficit production years. Several factors contributed to this year’s production shortfall, including the withering of cereal crops due to a series of dry spells and a shorter than usual rainy season; a reduction in irrigated crop area and crop yields due to antiquated irrigation systems and attacks by grain-eating birds; a lack of “walo” or flood recession crops – the main source of food for the Senegal River Valley – due to a lack of runoff from the river since the shutdown of the Manantalli Dam; and heavy damage to lowland and late-season rainfed crops from pink stalk borers (Sesamia Calamistis).

In a country where 30 percent of rural households rely on agriculture as their sole source of food and income, the comparatively low level of grain production (from rainfed and off-season crops) has weakened food security conditions for approximately 32% of the population of the Senegal River Valley and farming areas for late-season rainfed crops. The hunger season is expected to start in April in these areas, three months ahead of schedule.  Food security remains relatively stable in pastoral areas, but there are signs of earlier than usual seasonal migration by herders in the northern and central reaches of the country, with the deterioration in the condition of local pasturelands and water access problems.

While there is no food crisis in Mauritania, there are pockets of highly food insecure populations, attributable to limited cross-border trade (due to production shortfalls in Senegal, the country’s main trading partner, and the slowdown in trade with Mali) and the deterioration in terms of trade (rising market prices for cereals and falling prices for small animals) to the detriment of vulnerable households.

The World Food Program (WFP) estimates the size of the food-insecure population at 600,000 individuals, of whom 390,172 are targeted for assistance through programs run by the Food Security Commission (CSA), WFP and international NGOs. It is highly likely that these figures will increase over the next few months with the emergence of new pockets of food insecurity in pastoral and rural agropastoral areas.

Most likely food security scenario

Table 1. Scenario indicators   Most likely scenario: Earlier-than-normal start of the hunger season (three months earlier than usual) Slowdown in cross-border trade Increased purchasing/borrowing on local markets Premature seasonal migration of livestock (two months earlier than usual) Increase in malnutrition rates     Worst-case scenario: Massive seasonal migration of households and livestock Inoperability or shutdown of assistance programs Locust infestations Increase in malnutrition rates above seasonal norms and internationally-accepted emergency thresholds

The most likely food security scenario for Mauritania is a gradual deterioration in household food security conditions similar to that of the last few years during this time. Grain production for 2006/07, at most, covers two months worth of household needs (compared with an average of four to five months), with the lean period beginning in April of this year, three months earlier than usual. Malnutrition rates are expected to climb due to continuing shortages of crops and income (rising levels of poverty), existing structural problems and local child feeding practices.

The lack of family food reserves, after a series of poor crop years, the slowdown in cross-border trade with Senegal due to poor production there and the small volume of grain imports from Mali earmarked for rural markets, mean that Mauritanian households must continue to rely on purchasing and/or borrowing (in some cases at exorbitant rates of interest) commercially marketed foodstuffs, such as imported rice and wheat, at constantly rising prices.

Herders and agropastoralists are already selling small animals as the basis for their coping strategies, but terms of trade for livestock will weaken as pasture resources become increasingly scarce, as is normal for this time of year. Herders will begin their seasonal migration two months earlier than usual due to a lack of watering holes for their animals.  Farm families will turn to borrowing, out-migration and various assistance programs mounted by the Mauritanian government and its food security partners such as WFP, UNICEF, USA, the European Union and various NGOs in the form of food for work (FFW) projects, village-level food security reserve (SAVS) programs, community feeding centers (CACs) and general food aid distributions.

In the worst-case scenario, approximately 600,000 residents of rural areas will be classified as food insecure. Current responses should be adequate, though targeting practices will need to be reviewed and improved to better identify food insecure populations. Operating procedures for SAVS programs also will need to be strengthened to prevent pipeline breaks (in SAVS and CACs) and facilitate program access for poor households, who are not always able to afford the current required minimum purchase (a 50 kg sack selling at between 2800 and 3500 UM).

Worst-case food security scenario

The worst case food security scenario for Mauritania is marked by:

1. Massive migration by livestock, due to complete depletion of pastureland and/or watering holes;
2. Increased, massive out-migration by entire households to regional capitals, large cities, and surrounding countries, due to serious food access problems attributable to shortfalls in rainfed crop production, the poor performance of lowland crops and high market prices. This rural exodus could create new shantytowns and/or quickly enlarge existing slum areas in rural capitals and large cities, and create a farm labor crisis early in the rainy season.
3. The inoperability or shutdown of current food security programs due to pipeline breaks caused by inadequate supplies and/or transportation problems.
4. Locust infestations prior to the 2007 harvest of rainfed crops, which would cause food insecurity levels in Mauritania to soar.

The materialization of this scenario would mean a lack of production, further prolonging the hunger season for many poor households in farming and agropastoral areas of Aftout, the Senegal River Valley and the Southeast, areas which have grown virtually no crops since October of 2003. This situation would be paralleled by deteriorating conditions in structurally deficit areas in the northern reaches of the country (Inchiri and Adrar). The high levels of debt created by this lack of production would limit household access to markets. Such a scenario would also mean higher malnutrition rates, rising levels of poverty and a revamping of household economies and profiles. This could have serious consequences into the month of August for herders and into the next harvest season (October to November of 2007) for the farm population.

Added to the 600,000 farmers and agropastoralists engaged mainly in crop farming activities already identified as food insecure are approximately 200,000 farmers of lowland crops and 300,000 small-scale herders in transhumant pastoral and rainfed farming areas. This brings the number of food insecure rural residents affected under this scenario to 1,100,000, or 80 percent of the country’s rural population.

Since the country’s food security partners do not envisage the worse-case actually materializing, there is no planned response.  Only the already-established locust control program has the necessary resources to cope with conditions under such a scenario. In 2006, FEWS NET, WFP and the CSA formed a food security monitoring group, which later expanded to include other food security partners (UNICEF, FAO, UNDP, the Ministry of Rural Development and Environment (MDRE) and several NGOs). It is absolutely essential to reactivate this group, which was formed specifically for purposes of assessing conditions and suggesting appropriate preventive or corrective measures.