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Jakarta/Brussels, 4 October 2007: Poor governance, criminal activities of ex-rebels and a dysfunctional reintegration program are causing concern in post-conflict Aceh, but the long-term threat to peace is the unresolved issue of Aceh’s authority vis-à-vis the central government.

Aceh: Post-conflict Complications,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines political developments since the victory of Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) candidates in the December 2006 local government elections. While political power has formed a new GAM elite, it has also created new divisions between well-funded commanders and many rank-and-file who feel they have not received their fair share. Extortion, robbery and illegal logging involving ex-combatants are serious problems, and a reintegration program – recently restructured and perhaps on the mend – has been marred by confusion of objectives and lack of accountability.

“The euphoria that swept Aceh in December is gone”, says John Virgoe, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. “It has been replaced by a sense that the new elite is not that different from the old, and as many divisions are being created as healed in Acehnese society.”

Internal rifts in GAM will subside if problems with Jakarta heat up. Two issues could cause that to happen in the lead-up to 2009 parliamentary elections: intelligence operations to strengthen “anti-separatist” groups and failure to make progress toward bridging differences between Jakarta and Aceh over implementation of the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement.

Some of those differences can and should be addressed through a mechanism that allows for top-level dialogue, especially over issues that relate to the authority and function of the Aceh government. The 2006 Law on Government Aceh did not lay those issues to rest, and new tensions can emerge as implementing regulations are drafted.

While dialogue takes place, GAM leaders need to concentrate on delivering tangible benefits and keeping their supporters under control, rather than laying all blame at Jakarta’s door. The central government needs to ensure that its intelligence agencies keep their interventionist tendencies in check.

“The Yudhoyono government sees Aceh as a closed book with a happy ending”, says Sidney Jones, the Asia Program’s Senior Adviser. “It’s true that the conflict is over, but the peace needs more work.”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Peace in Aceh continues to hold but where the Yudhoyono government and many in Jakarta see a closed book with a happy ending, many Acehnese see a temporary respite from a conflict that will inevitably resume. The behaviour of many elected Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) officials and ex-combatants is part of the reason for gloom: Acehnese voters seem to have substituted one venal elite for another. Extortion, robbery and illegal logging involving ex-combatants – although they are not the only culprits – are cause for concern, and a reintegration program initially aimed at helping former fighters economically has been marred by confusion of goals, lack of strategy and lack of accountability. But unresolved issues between Aceh and Jakarta are the real time bomb, and the two sides need to establish an appropriate forum for working these out.

The election of GAM members to provincial and district offices in December 2006 has helped create lucrative patronage networks: jobs and contracts have gone to the victors. Even so, unemployment of ex-combatants remains high and may be one factor in the rash of incidents involving illicit efforts to get quick cash. The Aceh Reintegration Board (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, BRA) has been dysfunctional since its creation. New leadership since April 2007 and a new orientation since August may address some of the management problems; whether the latter will facilitate reconciliation or further polarise communities is not clear. No one, including donors, seems to have a clear idea whether reintegration funding is an entitlement under the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement, a vehicle for community reconciliation, compensation for past sacrifice or a mechanism for economic empowerment of individuals. Allegations over inequitable distribution of benefits have further divided a fractious and decentralised GAM.

A political rift that emerged before the elections between the exiled leadership in Sweden led by Malik Mahmud and a younger generation led by Irwandi Yusuf, now governor, and many of the field commanders, has deepened. In preparation for the 2009 elections, GAM supporters may field at least three separate parties. One that has caused consternation in Jakarta, called simply “GAM Party” with the GAM pro-independence flag as its symbol, in fact represents just Malik’s minority faction.

Internal feuding will subside, however, if problems with Jakarta heat up. Two issues in particular could cause that to happen in the lead-up to elections: intelligence operations to strengthen “anti-separatist” forces, and GAM pressure, applied unstrategically, for full implementation of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). GAM leaders have valid concerns about provisions of the Law on Governing Aceh (LOGA) passed in mid-2006 that diluted or undermined key principles of that MoU. Some of these can and should be addressed through a mechanism that allows for top-level dialogue and working through issues, especially as they relate to the authority and function of Aceh’s autonomous local government. But GAM leaders also need to realise that trying to open LOGA to amendment by the parliament in Jakarta in a pre-election environment could be playing with fire.

While dialogue takes place, GAM leaders need to concentrate on governing, delivering tangible benefits to Acehnese with the considerable funding at their disposal and keeping their supporters under control, rather than laying all blame for lack of progress at Jakarta’s door. The central government needs to ensure that its intelligence agencies keep their interventionist tendencies in check.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To GAM Officials in Aceh:

1.  Spend less time in Jakarta and abroad and concentrate on improving government services.

2.  Develop and apply concrete performance goals for the provincial and district governments.

3.  Exert stricter discipline over renegade members, particularly in North Aceh, and ensure that those known to be involved in crimes are turned over to the police.

4.  Make clear that no demands from members of GAM’s armed wing, now called the Aceh Transition Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh, KPA), for percentages of project funding will be tolerated and that verified reports of such demands will lead to the exclusion of those responsible from reintegration benefits.

5.  Break with the corrupt practices of the past by ensuring that procedures for awarding government contracts are fully transparent.

6.  Commit to retaining the logging moratorium until other announced forestry sector reforms are complete.

7.  Develop a strategy to press for fuller implementation of the Helsinki MoU that takes Jakarta political factors into account, understanding that progress will be slow and incremental.

To the Government of Indonesia:

8.  Work with GAM leaders to set up a dialogue mechanism that has a broader mandate than the Communication and Coordination Forum (Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi, FKK) and can work through some of the problems related to the LOGA, including review of draft implementing regulations.

9.  Refrain from funding anti-separatist groups.

10.  Take care in drafting LOGA implementing regulations that they reflect the spirit of the MoU and acknowledge a genuine autonomy for Aceh that is qualitatively different than that of other provinces.

11.  Investigate and prosecute backers of illegal logging operations, not just low-level labour.

To the Aceh Reintegration Board (BRA) and Reintegration Program Donors:

12.  Hire an independent auditing team with expertise on Aceh to do an in-depth assessment of how reintegration funds have been spent and their economic, social and political impact.

13.  Develop a strategic plan for reintegration that includes a common understanding of what that concept is; what the ultimate objective of the various programs should be; what concrete benchmarks should be set for 2007 and 2008; and how the program fits into a broader development strategy for Aceh.

Jakarta/Brussels, 4 October 2007