Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 18 July 2007: Haiti’s nascent stability and security will remain fragile unless state institutions are extensively strengthened.

Consolidating Stability in Haiti,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines how the weak state needs to consolidate its recent gains. President René Garcia Préval, with strong support from the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), has made real progress in dismantling violent gangs in Port-au-Prince but, for long-term success, state institutions must be strengthened nationwide and basic services provided to the poorest as soon as possible.

“Haiti has an historic opportunity to design a democratic future and establish conditions conducive to economic development”, says Damien Helly, Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst in Haiti. “However, the state remains very weak and in need of continued security and political, financial and technical support”.

Large-scale disarmament has not happened, and violence reduction programs have started slowly. Drug trafficking, political manipulation of the justice sector and impunity are prevalent. Post-conflict and transitional assistance has only just begun to trickle into the capital, and donor/government coordination remains inefficient. The economy is growing, state financial reserves are rising, and inflation and exchange rates are under control but the average citizen has not felt an improvement in living conditions.

MINUSTAH is a bulwark of the security environment but the development of an honest and community-friendly Haitian National Police (HNP) is crucial. To consolidate real stability in the country, the government should oppose any attempt to re-establish the army or otherwise create a second national security force. The rule of law must be strengthened through prison and justice reform, with the extent of future funding linked over time to progress in implementation".

Haiti needs additional competent personnel to encourage decentralised development, limit rural exodus and support democratic governance through local, participatory development projects. The international community should emphasise capacity and institution building, make Haiti a priority country for the new UN Peacebuilding Commission and allocate $50 million to UN agencies to support governance at all levels.

“President Préval enjoys domestic and international support to implement an ambitious, long-term, reform agenda”, says Mark Schneider, Crisis Group Senior Vice President and Special Adviser on Latin America. “He will be able to keep the country from sliding back into all too familiar chaos only if he strengthens state structures, launches major, community-based programs and addresses remaining grievances in society.”

To access the executive summary and recommendations in French, please click here.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Haiti’s security and stability remain fragile. President René Préval has endorsed national policies for security, police, justice and prison reform, but a weak state and decades, if not centuries, of institutional abandonment, make implementation slow, difficult and uneven. His first real success has been the dismantling of the toughest gangs in Port-au-Prince, but for this to be sustainable a community-friendly Haitian National Police (HNP) needs to be built under the security umbrella provided by the UN peacekeepers (MINUSTAH), infrastructure and economic opportunity must appear in the capital’s poor neighbourhoods, and comparable recovery and reconstruction have to be extended across the country.

Post-conflict and transitional assistance is only starting to trickle into the capital, whose communes have still not perceived the start of a new era. Likewise, donor and government coordination is not yet efficient: in Cité Soleil, one of the main areas wrested from the gangs, vital time has been wasted in prolonged negotiations about where and when the HNP would establish its permanent presence. The majority of the most-wanted gang members have been killed or arrested but some have already paid their way out of prison or been replaced by younger, no less violent lieutenants, and others are in hiding. More than a dozen private incidents of revenge, including lynchings, have occurred in Cité Soleil since January 2007. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and other community violence reduction programs have been too slow. Peacebuilding initiatives are required that bring income, community services and hope to these communities quickly.

To embed stability Haiti must also halt political manipulation of the justice sector, end impunity and assure both accountability and due process of law. Short-term actions include establishing a special criminal court chamber to handle certain serious crimes, as well as non-partisan investigation, prosecution and trial of suspects in the most sensitive political assassinations and killings of the last decade – steps that require strong support from the president and Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis. Parliament’s early passage of the judiciary reform package is also essential. Longer-term improvements require donor-government agreement on benchmarked changes in justice practices, with the extent of future funding linked over time to progress in implementation.

State structures are still extremely weak, especially at the various local levels, the number and complexity of which add to the inefficiency of governance. Decentralisation is important and should be pursued but so should a national consensus on changes, including constitutional amendments if necessary, to rationalise the local governance system and turn it into one that Haiti can afford without massive donor subsidies.

Revenue collection, state reserves and economic growth are rising, and inflation and exchange rates are under control, but the average citizen has not felt an improvement in living conditions. Customs revenue is far less than its potential because of corruption and smuggling. Similarly, the lack of administrative capacity limits the ability of the 140 municipalities to impose and collect local fees and taxes and so to meet local needs, and is even more apparent in the near abandonment of rural communities where some 60 per cent of the population lives.

Ministries and public institutions must accelerate public spending and investment and speed up massive infrastructure renovation. Numerous job creation and investment projects have been planned but not implemented; the most successful ones, with potential to spark cultural change and new local governance practices, have been single-shot efforts, yet to be extended for national impact. President Préval recently spoke of rooting out corruption at all levels of government as a priority but, as with so much else that is needed to ensure the country does not slide back into all too familiar chaos when international attention inevitably wanes, little has yet been done.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the President, Prime Minister and Government of Haiti:

1.  Oppose any attempt to create a second national security force, beside the Haitian National Police (HNP).

2.  Appoint locally respected leaders as new departmental delegates and vice delegates or confirm those currently in office so as to put an end to uncertainty at local levels.

3.  Reinforce the interior ministry with more and better trained staff so it can:

(a)  support and supervise municipal and other local officials; and

(b)  determine and support best practices in local development and governance projects for replication nationwide.

4.  Coordinate national conferences on local governance and incorporate recommendations into a renewed legal framework for comprehensive reforms, including, if determined to be necessary, constitutional changes, to:

(a)  simplify public administration by reducing the number of local bodies and administrative levels and the cost of elections by merging councils and assemblies as appropriate;

(b)  redraw territorial boundaries to provide for greater equality in political representation;

(c)  empower municipalities, delegations and vice delegations to play a more active role in local development, while considering the need to assign consultative roles to Communal Section Assemblies (ASECs) and Communal Section Councils (CASECs) as well as departmental assemblies and councils; and

(d)  strengthen local taxation capacity and speed revenue sharing.

5.  Implement more rapidly the government’s plan for Cité Soleil, expanding it to include maintenance, municipal administration and citizen security, and clarify the chain of command for coordinating the Cité Soleil task force.

6.  Tighten coordination between the national commission for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (CNDDR), donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in order to agree on criteria for enforcing compliance with disarmament requirements and reinsertion standards and preventing gang violence.

7.  Instruct the justice ministry to undertake an independent review of the need to reopen or re-launch criminal cases involving assassinations where suspicion of improper political influence exists.

8.  Create, through appropriate administrative measures, a special criminal court chamber with jurisdiction over cases involving drug trafficking, kidnapping, terrorism, corruption, money laundering, human trafficking and organised crime.

To Parliamentarians and Political Parties:

9.  Make the workings of the legislative branch more professional by improving party discipline, following parliament’s internal rules and carrying out the agreed parliament reform plan.

10.  Act promptly on the government’s justice reform legislative package.

To the International Community, including the U.S., Canada, the EU, the International Financial Institutions and Other Major Donors:

11.  Put Haiti on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission as soon as possible and allocate $50 million from the Peacebuilding Fund to those UN agencies which can facilitate capacity building in governance at all levels, assist large-scale planning and encourage more rapid investment in sustainable infrastructure and service improvement in the “hot zones”.

12.  Contribute financial and technical assistance to the government’s plan for Cité Soleil.

13.  Support, following a national dialogue, the government’s strategy to simplify and strengthen local governance.

14.  Offer technical assistance to the justice ministry to strengthen justice administration and agree with the government on benchmarks for justice reform, including:

(a)  more efficient functioning of the detention commission;

(b)  adoption of the three draft reform bills on the status of magistrates, the judicial council and the magistrates school;

(c)  immediate review by a revitalised judiciary inspection body to determine appropriate sanctions against corrupt judges, lawyers and others involved in improper conduct with respect to serious crime cases; and

(d)  tangible progress in the police vetting process.

15.  Continue to apply pressure for quicker modernisation in customs administration and improved state control of ports.

16.  Support government anti-drugs programs, including by:

(a)  supporting vetted HNP anti-drugs units;

(b)  fully staffing U.S. anti-drugs offices in Haiti;

(c)  intensifying regional coordination on intelligence, surveillance and interdiction, including the permanent stationing of two U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency-supported helicopters to assist HNP/MINUSTAH action against clandestine air strips used by drug traffickers and off-shore air drops; and

(d)  providing MINUSTAH and HNP the capability to establish a maritime base on the southern coast from which to conduct regular patrols, surveillance and interdiction.

To MINUSTAH and UN Agencies:

17.  Improve coordination with the CNDDR and set up a reintegration program for vetted police staff.

18.  Launch major community policing training and community safety projects in the localities where HNP vetting has been successfully completed.

Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 17 July 2007