Pretoria/Brussels, 20 March 2008: The international community needs to have contingency plans ready in anticipation of rigged elections in Zimbabwe on 29 March that could precipitate a potentially violent crisis.

Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines likely scenarios for Zimbabwe’s simultaneous presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections. Even though President Robert Mugabe has two serious challengers, including for the first time one from within his own ruling party, he probably has the means to manipulate the process before, during and after balloting, sufficiently to keep his office, though possibly only after a violent run-off. If that happens, no government will emerge capable of ending the country’s long crisis.

“Zimbabweans desperately want change but have little faith these elections will produce it”, says François Grignon, Crisis Group’s Africa Program Director. “Even after the 29 March vote, a negotiated compromise will likely be essential to reverse a deteriorating political and economic situation but only the first step.”

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) mediation by South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki, which once offered the most realistic chance of resolving Zimbabwe’s eight-year crisis, has failed. Primary responsibility lies with Mugabe, who unilaterally called snap elections and ruled out passage before the polls of the new constitution. His ruling ZANU-PF party has subsequently been using all the extensive means at its disposal to maintain an unfair advantage in the campaign. The bitterly divided opposition must also share blame: it gained relevancy from the mediation but was unable to agree on an electoral strategy at a time of acute national crisis.

If the election leads to further confrontation, the African Union (AU) should be ready to promptly offer mediation for a power-sharing agreement to produce a transitional government with a reformist agenda. A settlement need not necessarily remove Mugabe. He might serve as a non-executive head of state during a transitional period in advance of fresh elections. The important point is for the region to be prepared to act quickly if the elections do not produce a legitimate government that can deal with a national crisis whose consequences are increasingly being felt beyond Zimbabwe’s borders. With South Africa and the SADC having lost some credibility, the AU needs to take the lead.

The wider international community must also be ready to provide concerted backing to AU-led mediation. The EU and U.S. have little appetite to re-engage with a ZANU-PF dominated government, but if that is the result of a genuinely negotiated agreement that aims at reconciliation and renewal, they should not hold back.

“If the region’s leaders were again to recognise an illegitimate government, Zimbabwe’s dramatic economic disintegration would continue, and the inevitable next round of the struggle over Mugabe’s succession could easily provoke bloodshed”, warns Andebrhan Giorgis, Crisis Group Senior Adviser.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The regional mediation offering the most realistic chance to resolve Zimbabwe’s eight-year crisis has failed. South African President Thabo Mbeki’s stated objective in talks between the ruling ZANU-PF party and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was to secure conditions for free and fair elections that would produce an undisputed outcome. But on 29 March 2008, Zimbabwe will hold elections already flawed by pre-poll misbehaviour, notwithstanding what may occur on polling day and thereafter. The results are likely to be heatedly disputed. Though the playing field is far from even, and efforts to create a united opposition have failed, ex-ZANU-PF politburo member Simba Makoni is seriously challenging Robert Mugabe’s re-election. The 84-year-old president probably has the means to manipulate the process sufficiently to retain his office, though possibly only after a violent run-off, but there is little prospect of a government emerging that is capable of ending the crisis. If the situation deteriorates, the African Union (AU) needs to be ready to offer prompt mediation for a power-sharing agreement between presidential contenders and creation of a transitional government with a reform agenda.

Primary responsibility for the failure of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) initiative lies with Mugabe. He and his party conceded changes to security, media and election laws, while obtaining MDC acceptance of a constitutional amendment that paved the way for simultaneous presidential, parliamentary and local government elections and facilitated his opportunity to use the parliament to select his own eventual successor. But at the end of January 2008, Mugabe unilaterally called snap elections and ruled out passage before the polls of the new constitution that was supposed to be the single most important product of the negotiations. ZANU-PF has subsequently been using all the extensive means at its disposal to maintain an unfair advantage. The bitterly divided opposition must also share blame: it gained relevancy from the mediation but was unable to agree on an electoral strategy at a time of acute national crisis, thus exposing a serious failure of leadership. The MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai retains a following and may reach a run-off against Mugabe but appears to have little chance of election.

Makoni, who is also a former finance minister and head of SADC, announced his presidential candidacy on 5 February. This first open challenge to Mugabe from within the ruling party since independence in 1980 is engineered by some ZANU-PF heavyweights, notably retired General Solomon Mujuru in the background and former liberation war commander Dumiso Dabengwa in public. While some of Makoni’s backers are driven by economic self-interest, others want genuine change and have made overtures to the MDC for a government of national unity; Arthur Mutambara has put his breakaway MDC faction behind the ruling party renegade. Makoni’s candidacy is viewed favourably by regional governments, who have long considered a reformed ZANU-PF able to control the security apparatus the most desirable transition option.

Makoni’s late entry and limited grassroots support, as well as the opaque nature of his establishment backing work against him, but his challenge has thrown ZANU-PF into turmoil and left Mugabe unsure of his allies. Influential actors within the security apparatus are quietly lining up behind Makoni. Mugabe, however, is likely prepared to do whatever is necessary to defeat him, quite possibly including escalation of violence in the event of a run-off, even at the risk of sparking bloody factional fighting within ZANU-PF.

Only “friendly” countries and institutions have been invited to observe the polls, and it is critical that the AU and SADC judge the overall electoral environment and preparations, not just conduct on election day itself, in strict accordance with their regional principles. In the event the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, which he appears to dominate, declares Mugabe the winner in the face of massive abuse and manipulation of the overall process, the outcome should be rejected. While the national circumstances are different, if the situation deteriorates the AU should have contingency plans in place to offer emergency diplomatic assistance to the parties as it did recently to defuse the Kenya crisis. 

A negotiated settlement need not necessarily remove Mugabe. He might, for example, serve as a non-executive head of state during a transitional period until new elections can be held. The important point at this stage is for the region to be prepared to act quickly if, as is likely, the elections do not produce a clearly legitimate government that can deal with a national crisis whose consequences are increasingly being felt beyond Zimbabwe’s borders, especially in terms of migrant pressures. With South Africa and SADC having lost some credibility, the AU needs to take the lead.  

Events in Zimbabwe are outrunning international policy. If the elections go badly, so that violence increases, the humanitarian crisis grows worse, and the population exodus puts the stability of regional neighbours under greater pressure, the Security Council may yet need to take up the deteriorating situation. For now, the wider international community must be ready to provide concerted backing to an AU-led mediation, including by offering an economic and political recovery program guided by principles of good governance and designed to promote institutional and security sector reform. The EU and U.S. have little appetite to re-engage with a ZANU-PF dominated government, particularly if there is still a place in it for Mugabe, but if that is the result of a genuinely negotiated agreement that aims at reconciliation and renewal, they should not hold back.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC):

1.  Extend voting to a second day if confusion caused by the redrawing of electoral boundaries makes this necessary in order to allow all registered voters the opportunity to cast a ballot.

2.  Give maximum transparency and credibility to the results by publicly announcing tallies at the constituency level and allowing party agents, as well as national and international observers, to monitor the compilation at the national command centre.

To the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), National and Other Foreign Election Observer Teams:

3.  Observe the elections and assess their legitimacy in strict accordance with regional and international standards.

To the AU Chair, Jakaya Kikwete, in coordination with South Africa and SADC:

4.  Conduct contingency consultations and planning so as to be prepared in the event that the announced results of the elections are heatedly disputed and national and regional observers report credible evidence of widespread irregularities, whether occurring before the election, on polling day or during subsequent counting of votes, to:

(a)  issue a joint statement that the regional bodies are withholding recognition of the results; and

(b)  dispatch a high-level AU mediation to assist negotiation of a power-sharing agreement between ZANU-PF, the MDC factions and the camp represented by Simba Makoni, with a view to establishing a transitional government that would implement institutional, economic and security sector reforms in advance of new elections.

To President Mugabe and his Allies within the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF):

5.  Desist from escalating the violence during the remaining campaign period and in particular in the event of a run-off.

6.  Engage constructively in negotiations facilitated by the AU to establish a government of transition if the results of the elections are heatedly disputed and not accepted by the African regional bodies.

To the ZANU-PF Faction Led by Simba Makoni and the MDC Factions Led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara:  

7.  Eschew violence, form a united front of all opposition forces in parliament and demand an AU-led mediation with the objective of establishing a transitional government of national unity if the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission declares President Mugabe re-elected in the face of major vote rigging.

To the U.S., European Union (EU), EU Member States and Wider International Community:

8.  Review the targeted sanctions lists following elections and consider:

(a)  extending the measures against human rights abusers in the security services and/or those blocking a political settlement to the crisis; and

(b)  relaxing the measures against individuals within ZANU-PF who show an open and genuine commitment to engage in power-sharing talks and join forces to restore democratic governance.

9.  Intensify planning for an economic and political recovery package guided by principles of good governance and designed to promote institutional change and state publicly an unambiguous intention to re-engage if a government of national unity is established and key constitutional, political and economic reforms are implemented.

10.  Refer Zimbabwe for discussion at the UN Security Council in the event of a massive outbreak of violence or other grave developments threatening peace and security in the country and the region.

Pretoria/Brussels, 20 March 2008