Kampala/Nairobi/Brussels, 26 April 2007: The peace talks which resume today in Juba (southern Sudan) may well be able to end the brutal twenty-year insurrection in northern Uganda but they need more robust international support.

Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace,* the latest International Crisis Group report, examines the ten-month-old peace process between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government. Both sides have agreed to renew their cessation of hostilities agreement and restart the Juba negotiation that stalled early this year. However, to achieve lasting peace, a more comprehensive strategy is needed both to address the conditions that have created a cycle of conflict in northern Uganda and guard against destabilisation in neighbouring Congo and Sudan.

“The peace talks have improved security and begun to allow a few of the 1.4 million internally-displaced northern Ugandans to return home”, says Adam O’Brien, Crisis Group analyst, “but some of the wrong issues are on the table, the wrong LRA negotiators are present, and UN Special Envoy and ex-Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano does not yet have sufficient leverage to overcome the mutual mistrust. Simply resuming the talks under the current structure would be a recipe for failure”.

A solution to one of Africa’s longest and most brutal conflicts requires two-tracks. The first, the Juba talks, should focus on ending the LRA security threat. Chissano needs more help, especially from the U.S. and UK, and he needs to be empowered to present a package of security and livelihood guarantees directly to the reclusive LRA leader, Joseph Kony. The second track should focus on a follow-up national reconciliation forum, with much wider participation, that addresses the north’s political, economic and social alienation and includes a plan for northern Ugandans to redevelop their communities and reintegrate returning rebels.

The investigation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has increased pressure on the LRA’s indicted leaders to negotiate and should continue. Finally, contingency planning on a regional security strategy for use against the LRA if Juba fails should begin now and include military and political cooperation between Uganda, the Government of Southern Sudan, Congo and the UN missions in Sudan and Congo.

“The LRA’s commitment to peace cannot be taken for granted”, says Francois Grignon, Crisis Group Africa Director. “Khartoum has long supported the rebels, and its role as a spoiler is a continued concern. There is evidence the LRA is still getting arms from Khartoum, by a new route through insurgent areas in the Central African Republic, and is recruiting former fighters in northern Uganda to rebuild its depleted ranks. The moment to act is now”.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the LRA leadership:

1.  Reinforce the Juba delegation with senior military commanders and decision makers.

2.  Respect all terms of the cessation of hostilities agreement, including moving all fighters to the designated assembly areas, and stop all movements towards the CAR.

To the Government of Uganda:

3.  Take advantage to the greatest extent possible of the improved security in the north to develop an effective national land policy, demilitarise security by bringing in police, re-establish rule of law by building courts and improve delivery of essential services to displaced civilians.

4.  Support establishment of a broader, more inclusive forum in Uganda to shape redevelopment, rehabilitation, and reconciliation in the northern region, and help address north-south tensions.

To the mediation team:

5.  Pursue direct talks with the LRA more vigorously, including by using a respected intermediary to deliver to Joseph Kony a clear security and livelihood package.

6.  Restructure the negotiations so that working groups can deal with all five points of the agenda in parallel.

7.  Promote a two-track process:

(a)  the Juba negotiations to make peace with the LRA, establish a roadmap for dealing with northern Uganda’s underlying structural problems and secure commitments from the government to address those problems and from donors to support the process; and

(b)  a broad-based, inclusive follow-up forum in Uganda, shaped by key stakeholders, including Acholi traditional leaders, women, and youth, to tackle redevelopment, rehabilitation, and reconciliation in the conflict-affected areas.

8.  Start preparing the communities of northern and eastern Uganda to take an active role in the second track on redevelopment, rehabilitation and reconciliation so as to build sustainable peace.

To the Government of Sudan:

9.  Do not interfere with the Juba talks and cease all military supply to the LRA, whether in Sudan or the CAR.

To the Government of Southern Sudan:

10.  Publicly and privately reassure the LRA that its safety on Sudan’s soil is assured as long as it remains committed to the peace process.

To UNMIS:

11.  Deploy troops around the assembly areas and seek from the UN Security Council a specific mandate and additional means to support the Juba talks adequately.

To UN Special Envoy, Joaquim Chissano:

12.  Establish an office in Juba to coordinate all international engagement in support of the talks and liaise with the U.S. and the UK in particular on an initiative to consolidate relations between Uganda, Congo and the Government of Southern Sudan and a joint LRA containment strategy.

To the U.S. and UK governments:

13.  Appoint senior diplomats to work closely with the UN Special Envoy and apply pressure on the Ugandan government to support a two-track strategy as described above and desist from threatening military intervention in Congo.

14.  Launch, in cooperation with the UN Special Envoy, an initiative for diplomatic and military cooperation between Uganda, the Government of Southern Sudan, Congo, UNMIS and MONUC that involves:

(a)  commitment to cooperate and exchange information for stabilising the common border areas and to desist from threatening military operations on another’s territory;

(b)  a joint contingency strategy to contain LRA force movements and prevent incursions into Uganda in the event of the Juba talks’ failure; and

(c)  a mechanism for joint monitoring and information exchange on all movements of armed groups in the border areas.

15.  Provide the necessary military assistance, training and funding to support deployment of Congolese and SPLM troops to contain LRA movements in the rebel-infested areas.

To the UN Security Council:

16.  Establish a panel of experts to investigate the LRA’s sources of financial and military support; apply sanctions on its national and international suppliers; and encourage member states to prosecute diaspora Ugandans who raise funds or provide weapons for the LRA from their territory.

17.  Urge member states to provide enhanced financial and logistical support to the efforts of the Special Envoy and his team.

To Donors:

18.  Warn the Ugandan government that any unauthorised, unilateral military intervention beyond its borders will result in strong consequences, such as the suspension of direct budgetary support and other forms of aid, and condition support for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of northern Uganda on the active participation of northerners, including civil society.

Kampala/Nairobi/Brussels, 26 April 2007